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Abstract
Dynamic dependability models, such as dynamic fault trees (DFTs) and
dynamic reliability block diagrams (DRBDs), are introduced to overcome the
modeling limitations of traditional models. Recently, higher-order logic (HOL)
formalizations of both models have been conducted, which allow the analysis
of these models formally, within a theorem prover. In this report, we provide
the formal dynamic dependability analysis of shuffle-exchange networks, which
are multistage interconnection networks that are commonly used in multiproces-
sor systems. We use DFTs and DRBDs to model the terminal, broadcast and
network reliability with dynamic spare gates and constructs in several generic
versions. We verify generic expressions of probability of failure and reliability of
these systems, which can be instantiated with any number of system components
and failure rates to reason about the failure behavior of these networks.
Keywords— Dynamic Dependability Analysis, Dynamic Fault Trees, Dynamic Reli-
ability Block Diagrams, Shuffle-exchange Networks
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1 Introduction
Dependability describes the ability of a system to provide a trusted service [1]. Dy-
namic dependability models, such as dynamic fault trees (DFTs) [2] and dynamic
reliability block diagrams [3], capture the dynamic failure and success dependencies,
respectively, among system components, and hence are more suitable in modeling real-
world systems. Recently, higher-order logic (HOL) theorem proving has been used in
the formal analysis of both models algebraically [4,5], where generic expressions are for-
mally verified that are independent of the failure distributions of system components.
This ensures the soundness of the analysis, which is suitable for safety-critical systems.
In this report, we use both formalizations in conducting the dynamic dependability
analysis of the interconnection network of multiprocessor systems.
With the ongoing demands for intensive processing applications, multiprocessor
systems represent one of the solutions that satisfies such demand. Nowadays, such
systems are feasible due to their reduced cost and thus it is possible to have systems
of hundreds of processors. Multiprocessor systems allow parallel computing, where
tasks are executed in parallel with the possibility of interacting with one another when
required. This parallel execution highly impacts the overall system performance, such
as throughput. However, memory and I/O peripheral resources are shared among pro-
cessors and thus an efficient data routing among system nodes is necessary to maintain
high system performance, reliability and low cost. This is of a great importance, par-
ticularly with scientific applications, where a huge number of processors are used, i.e.,
large-scale multiprocessor systems [6]. Therefore, a dedicated interconnection network
is used to connect processors and memory modules, as depicted in Figure 1 [6].
Figure 1: Overview of Multiprocessor System Architecture
The complexity of interconnection networks ranges from simple networks, such
as time-shared bus to crossbar switching. The former has a negative impact on the
system performance, while the latter has much higher cost as there exists a separate
link between each pair of nodes in the systems. For example, for a system of N nodes,
i.e., N inputs and N outputs, it is required to have N2 links or switching elements
between each input and output.
Multistage interconnection networks (MINs) are introduced to reduce the number
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of required switching elements and hence, reduce the cost while providing better per-
formance than shared-bus networks. The main idea of MINs is to have multiple small
stages of crossbar switches that are connected between sources (inputs) and destina-
tions (outputs), which results in a much reduced number of used switching elements.
The number of paths available between each input and output determines the category
of the MIN. A single-path MIN has only one path to route information between each
source-destination pair. A shuffle-exchange network (SEN) is an example of such type
of networks. Each stage has log2N switching elements, where N is the number of inputs
and outputs of the network. Usually the switching elements are of size 2× 2 to reduce
the cost. The number of stages required to establish the single-path MIN is Nlog2N ,
which is lower than crossbar networks. An 8 × 8 SEN is shown in Figure 2, where
only a single path is available for each input-output pair. However, the reliability of
single-path MINs and SENs depends on the switching elements and thus a fault in any
of these switches cannot be tolerated.
Enhancing the reliability of MINs is of great importance in order to maintain high
system performance. Therefore, redundant switching elements are used to ensure that
the network is able to provide the required switching even after the failure of some of
these elements [7, 8]. Multiple-path MINs are used to increase the fault tolerance and
hence the network reliability. SEN+ is a SEN, where an additional stage is added to
provide two paths between each input-output pair, as shown in Figure 3. However,
even with the additional path, the failure of some switches can lead to the failure
of the connection in some situations. Spare parts have been used in [9] to replace
switches after failure. However, the analysis was not conducted formally to ensure its
correctness.
Studying the reliability of SENs has been an active research area [10–13]. The reli-
ability of MINs are commonly analyzed using simulation or analytically. For example,
in [14], Monte Carlo simulation is used to analyze the reliability of SENs. However, as
mentioned previously, simulation cannot provide accurate results due to its sampling
based nature. Although CTMCs can analytically solve the reliability of MINs [15],
they cannot be used with large-scale systems since the state space grows exponentially
with the increase in the number of system components. On the other hand, when the
complexity of the network increases, reliability bounds provides estimate values for the
MIN reliability [16,17]. RBDs have been also used in the analysis of MINs with single
and multiple paths. For example, in [18], the reliability of SEN, SEN+ and SEN+2
(a SEN with two additional stages) is modeled using traditional RBDs. Generic ex-
pressions of success rates of the switching elements are provided analytically assuming
that all these elements have the same failure rates. However, these generic expressions
are not formally verified , which may raise questions about its accuracy. Furthermore,
dynamic dependencies among system components, like warm spares, are not considered
or modeled.
Based on the previous discussion, accurate modeling and analysis of these networks
is necessary to capture the dynamic behavior as this will provide the design engineers
with some measures that can help enhancing the performance of the entire multipro-
cessor system. To the best of our knowledge, dynamic dependability analysis using
formal methods has not been used with MINs. Therefore, we propose to add spare
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switches to replace the critical ones after failure and conduct the analysis of MINs,
particularly SENs using our formal dependability framework.
Figure 2: An 8× 8 SEN
Figure 3: An 8× 8 SEN+
Since the reliability of MINs affects the performance of the overall multiprocessor
system, it is required to accurately model and analyze their reliability. In this work,
we use both DRBDs and DFTs to model the dynamic reliability of these networks,
particularly SEN and SEN+, and conduct the analysis using our framework. In this
work, we formally verify the terminal, broadcast and network reliability of SEN and
SEN+ in HOL and provide generic expressions of reliability and probability of failure.
It is worth noting that the formalization provided in this work uses the HOL theories
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(libraries) of DFT and DRBD, which have been developed in [4, 5, 19] and can be
accessed from [20,21].
2 Terminal Reliability Analysis of Shuffle-exchange
Networks
The terminal reliability is the reliability of the connection between a given source and
destination, i.e., the probability of having a reliable connection between one source-
destination pair. We analyze the terminal reliability of the SEN and SEN+ using both
DFT and DRBD models.
2.1 DFT Analysis of SEN and SEN+
We model the sources of failure of both SEN and SEN+ using DFTs. We use n-ary
gates, which enable verifying expressions of the probability of failure for generic number
of system components.
Figure 4 shows the DFT model of the SEN system. Since SENs are single path
MINs, the failure of any of the switches in the path between a given source and des-
tination leads to losing the connection. Therefore, adding spare parts will lower the
probability of failure. For illustration purposes, we use a spare part to replace the main
switch Y after failure. The DFT consists of an n-ary OR gate, which means that the
failure of any of the switches, interrupts the connection between the source and the
destination.
Figure 4: DFT of SEN
Since the top event is an n-ary OR gate, we need first to verify that the DFT event
of the n-ary OR is equal to the union of the individual events, as:
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Theorem 2.1.
` ∀ p X t s. FINITE s ⇒
(DFT event p (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST s))) t =⋃
i∈s {rv to devent p X t i})
where s is a set of numbers that has the indices of the system components. X is a group
of random variables that represent the time-to-failure of the switches in the system. We
need to recall that n OR accepts a list of random variables as an argument. Therefore,
we create this list using MAP X (SET TO LIST s). rv to devent, in Theorem 2.1, is
similar to the rv to event of the DRBD, but it creates DFT events. It is defined as:
Definition 2.1. rv to devent
` ∀ p X t. rv to devent p X t = (λi. DFT event p (X i) t)
This way, we can use this function to create a group of DFT events for a set of
indexed random variables. Then, we verify the probability of the n-ary OR gate in a
way similar to the probability of the DRBD parallel structure, which is defined as the
union of events.
Theorem 2.2.
` ∀ p X t s. s 6= {} ∧ FINITE s
indep sets p (λi. {rv to devent p X t i}) s ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ s ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST s))) t) =
1 - Normal (
∏
i∈s (real (1 - FXi(t)))))
In Theorem 2.2, it is required that the set of indices, s, to be nonempty and to
be finite, which is a realistic condition as in any system the number of components is
finite. The last condition of Theorem 2.3, ensures that the random variables of X are
greater than or equal to 0 and not equal to +∞, which is required to be able to use
the CDF of the random variable as given in [19].
We express the structure function of the DFT of SEN as:
QdSEN Terminal = n OR (MAP (λi. if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else X i) (SET TO LIST {0} ∪ L)) (1)
We notice that the structure of the DFT is defined using the indices in {0} ∪ L.
0 is the index of the spare gate and L has the indices of the rest of the switches in the
system.
Finally, we verify the probability of failure of this top event as:
Theorem 2.3.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L.
DISJOINT {0} L ∧ FINITE L ∧ L 6= {} ∧
indep sets p (λi. {event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t, 0)]
(rv to devent p X t) i}) ({0} ∪ L) ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ∧
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(prob p (DFT event p QdSEN Terminal t) =
1-
(1- prob p (DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t)) *
Normal (
∏
i∈L (real(1-FXi(t))))
where DISJOINT {0} L ensures that the indices of the elements are unique. While
FINITE L ∧ L 6= {} ascertain that set L, which has the indices, is finite and not
empty. Finally, the independence of the events is added using indep sets. Theorem 2.3
can be further rewritten based on the probability of the spare gate [19]. However,
the required conditions of the latter should be satisfied, such as the continuity of the
distributions. Since we need a group of indexed sets in indep sets, we define a function
event set that accepts a list of pairs each of which is composed of a DFT event with
its index. This function also accepts the remaining blocks of the DFT that have their
indices embedded in a set (that can be generic of any size).
In SEN+, an additional path is added to increase the redundancy in the system.
Therefore, for the connection between a given source and a destination to be broken,
it is required that these two paths must be disconnected. The DFT of the SEN+ is
shown in Figure 5, where two spares are added to replace the main switches Y and
Z after failure. Switch Y is the input switch connected to the source and switch Z is
connected to the destination. This DFT is composed of three levels of OR of AND of
OR gates. Therefore, in order to verify the probability of the top event, we need first
to verify that the DFT event of the n-ary AND gate is equal to the intersection of the
input events. We formally verify this in HOL as:
Figure 5: DFT of SEN+ Terminal Connection
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Theorem 2.4.
` ∀ p X t s. FINITE s ∧ s 6= {} ∧ 0 ≤ t ⇒
(DFT event p
(n AND (MAP X (SET TO LIST s))) t =
⋂
i∈s {rv to devent p X t i})
Then, we verify the probability of failure of the top event of the AND gate as:
Theorem 2.5.
` ∀ p X t s. FINITE s ∧ s 6= {} ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
indep sets p (λi. {rv to devent p X t i}) s
(∀ i. i ∈ s ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p
(DFT event p
(n AND (MAP X (SET TO LIST s))) t) =
Normal (
∏
i∈s (real (FXi(t)))))
The first three conditions are needed to be able to use Theorem 2.4, while
indep sets ensures the independence of the events.
We use Theorems 2.2 and 2.5 to verify the probability of OR of AND of OR, which
is required for the probability of the top event. We express the top event of the DFT
of Figure 5, QdSEN+ as:
QdSEN+ Terminal = n OR (MAP (λi. if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then(
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2)))
)
else WSP Z Zsa Zsd) (SET TO LIST {0; 1; 2}))
(2)
where {0; 1; 2} indicates that the OR gate has three inputs with indices 0 for the first
spare, 1 for the AND of ORs, and 2 for the second spare. L1 and L2 has the indices
of the switches in the two redundant paths (for the two lower ORs).
The DFT top event can be expressed using union and intersection of events, which
can be quite useful in reusing the existing theorems of probability of union of intersec-
tions and intersection of unions. We verify this relationship as:
Theorem 2.6.
` ∀ p Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd X L1 L2 t.
FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧
disjoint family on (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}]) {0; 1; 2; 3} ⇒
(DFT event p (QdSEN+ Terminal) t =⋃
{⋂
{⋃
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{event set
[(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DFT event p (WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to devent p X t) i |
i ∈ ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}] a} | a |
a ∈ ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}] j} | j |
j ∈ {0; 1; 2}})
Finally, we verify the probability of failure of QdSEN+:
Theorem 2.7.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2. 0 ≤ t ∧
SEN set req p L1 L2 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
(event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DFT event p (WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to devent p X t)) ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ (L1 ∪ L2) ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p QdSEN+ Terminal t) =
1 -
(1 -
prob p (DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t)) *
(Normal
(1 -
(1 -
∏
i∈L1 (real (1 - FXi(t)))) *
(1 -
∏
i∈L2 (real (1 - FXi(t))))) *
(1 - prob p (DFT event p (WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t))))
where SEN set req ensures the required conditions of the input sets including that the
sets are finite and nonempty. It also ensures the independence of the input events over
the probability space. We also define ind set that accepts a list of sets and returns a
group of indexed sets. This is required to be able to create the hierarchy of the DFT
using sets.
In order to use the above generic probability of failure expressions on a concrete in-
stance of SEN+, we evaluate in MATLAB [22] the probability of failure of the terminal
connection of a 128× 128 SEN+, where each OR gate of the first level of Figure 5 has
6 inputs. We assume that the failure rate of each switching element is 1 × 10−5. We
evaluate the probability of failure for the SEN+ system without and with spare parts
with a dormancy factor of 0.1, as shown in Figure 6. This result shows that considering
the spares in the analysis leads to having more reliable and realistic system than the
traditional FTs.
2.2 DRBD Analysis of SEN and SEN+
For SENs (single-path MIN), the terminal reliability is modeled as a series RBD. For
illustration purposes, we use a spare part to replace the first input switch, and thus
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Figure 6: Probability of Failure of the Terminal Connection of a 128× 128 SEN+ with
and without Spares
increase the reliability. The DRBD of the modified SEN is shown in Figure 7, where
Y is the main switch that will be replaced by Y s after failure and the series structure
has m+ 1 elements.
Figure 7: DRBD of SEN
Using the proposed DRBD algebra in [5], we express the structure function of the
SEN DRBD as:
QSEN Terminal = nR AND (λi. if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else X i) {0} ∪ L (3)
where X is a group of indexed time-to-failure functions that represent the blocks of
the series structure and L is a set with their indices. L can be instantiated with any
group of numbers, which makes this function generic to represent the reliability model
of any SEN with any size.
Then, we verify that the DRBD event of QSEN can be represented using the series
parallel structures as:
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Theorem 2.8.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L.
DISJOINT {0} L ∧ FINITE L ∧ L 6= {} ⇒
(DRBD event p QSEN Terminal t =
DRBD series
(λi. event set
[(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0)]
(rv to event p X t) i) ({0} ∪ L) )
where DISJOINT ensures that all sets are disjoint. We use event set and ind set to
create the events, similar to the DFTs. Since we are dealing with a series structure, we
only need to specify the heirarchy of the architecture in one direction using {0} ∪ L.
We verify Theorem 2.8 using the relationship between nR AND and DRBD series verified
in [5] and some set-related theorems.
Based on Theorem 2.8, we verify a generic expression for the reliability of the SEN
system:
Theorem 2.9.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L.
DISJOINT {0} L ∧ FINITE L ∧ L 6= {} ∧
indep sets p (λi. {event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t, 0)]
(rv to event p X t) i}) ({0} ∪ L)⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QSEN Terminal t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t * Normal (
∏
l∈L (real (Rel p (X l) t))))
In a similar manner, the SEN+ is modeled as a series-parallel-series structure. To
further enhance the reliability, we use spare constructs as shown in Figure 8, where Y
and Z are the main single switches that are connected to the source and destination
with their spares Y s and Zs, respectively. The parallel structure in the middle rep-
resents the reliability model of the two alternative paths between the source and the
destination. Therefore, this DRBD consists of a series of two spare constructs and one
parallel structure that consists of two series structures.
Figure 8: Terminal Reliability DRBD of SEN+
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Using our DRBD operators, we formally express the structure function of this
DRBD as:
QSEN+ Terminal = nR AND (λi. if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) + (nR AND X L2)
)
else R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) {0; 1; 2}
(4)
Thus, the outer series structure is expressed using the nR AND operator over the set
{0; 1; 2} as this structure has three different structures; i.e., two spare constructs and
one parallel structure. In order to re-utilize the verified expressions of reliability, it
is required to express this DRBD using the series and parallel structures. Therefore,
we verify that the DRBD event of the QSEN+ is equal to a nested series-parallel-series
structure as:
Theorem 2.10.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2.
disjoint family on (ind set [{0; 3}; L1; L2]) {0;1;2} ∧
FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ L1 6= {} ∧ L2 6= {} ⇒
(DRBD event p QSEN+ Terminal t =
DRBD series (λj.
DRBD parallel (λa.
DRBD series (λi.
event set
[(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DRBD event p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to event p X t) i)
ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}] a))
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}] j)) {0; 1; 2})
where disjoint family on (ind set [{0; 3}; L1; L2]) {0;1;2} ensures that the
sets {0; 3}, L1 and L2 are disjoint, i.e., each switch has a unique index. Since we
are dealing with a series-parallel-series structure, we need three sets to identify the
hierarchy of this nested structure. Set {0; 1; 2} in Theorem 2.10 indicates that the
outer series structure has three elements, i.e., three parallel structures. ind set [{0};
{1;2}; {3}] indicates that the first parallel structure has only one series structure
with index 0, the second parallel structure has two series structures with indices 1
and 2, and the third parallel structure has only one series structure with index 3.
Finally, ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}] implies that the first series structure has only
one element with index 0, the second and third series structures have an arbitrary
number of blocks indexed by L1 and L2. The last series structure has one element
with index 3. We verify Theorem 2.10 using the relationship between the event of
nR AND and the DRBD series and the equivalence of the event of the OR with the
union of events besides some set-related theorems.
Based on Theorem 2.10, we verify a generic expression for the reliability of the
SEN+ system:
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Theorem 2.11.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2.
SEN set req p L1 L2 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DRBD event p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to event p X t)) ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QSEN Terminal t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t * Rel p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t *
(1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))))
where SEN set req is the same function that we use with DFTs. We first rewrite the
goal using Theorem 2.10, then we use the reliability of the series-parallel-series to verify
the final expression. The reliability of the spare constructs can be further rewritten
using the probability of the spare construct verified in [5] given that the required
conditions are ensured, such as the continuity of the CDFs. It can be noticed that
the DRBD and the DFT models possess the same hierarchy represented by the sets of
indices, which makes it easy to be used when going from one model to the other.
Similar to the DFT analysis, we evaluate the terminal reliability of a 128 × 128
SEN+, where each inner series structure of Figure 8 has 6 blocks. We assume that the
failure rate of each switching element is 1 × 10−5. We evaluate the reliability for the
SEN+ system without and with spare parts with a dormancy factor of 0.1, as shown
in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Terminal Reliability of 128× 128 SEN+ with and without Spares
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3 Broadcast Reliability Analysis of Shuffle-
exchange Networks
The broadcast reliability represents the probability of having a working connection
between one source and all destinations. This is required when one of the processors
in the system needs to transmit information to all destinations in the network. We
present in this section, the broadcast reliability of the SEN and SEN+ using both DFT
and DRBD models.
3.1 DFT Analysis of SEN and SEN+
Since in SENs there exists a single path between each source and destination, it is re-
quired to have a successful transmission through all these paths for a proper broadcast.
Therefore, the DFT can be modeled using an OR gate. We further lower the proba-
bility of failure by adding an additional spare gate, as shown in Figure 4. However,
the number of DFT inputs, which represent the switches, varies between the terminal
and broadcast reliability models. For example, consider an 8× 8 SEN. The number of
inputs for the terminal DFT is 3, i.e., log28, while the broadcast DFT requires seven
inputs, i.e.,
∑log28
i=1 (
8
2i
) [18]. Therefore, we can also use Theorem 2.3 for the broadcast,
since this theorem is verified for any number of system blocks with their indices in the
set s . This highlights the importance of having generic verified expressions for any
number of system blocks, which enables the re-utilization of the theorems in different
contexts.
The DFT model of the broadcast SEN+ is shown in Figure 10. Its top event is
modeled using an OR gate that is connected to a spare gate for the input switch,
AND of OR to model the two alternative paths and finally, the rest of the destination
switches in order to have a proper broadcast transmission.
We formally express the structure function of the top event as:
QdSEN+ Broadcast = n OR (MAP (λi. if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then(
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2)))
)
else (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L3))))
(SET TO LIST {0; 1; 2}))
(5)
The hierarchy of the DFT is divided using the sets of indices. We need to recall
that MAP X (SET TO LIST L1), MAP X (SET TO LIST L2) and MAP X (SET TO LIST
L3) are used to create the lists of the group of random variables for the n-ary gates.
L1 and L2 has the indices of the switches in the two alternative paths, i.e., the inputs
of the two lower OR gates in the DFT of Figure 10, while L3 has the indices of the
remaining inputs of the top OR gate. The set {0; 1; 2} indicates that the top OR gate
has three inputs, which is similar to the terminal DFT model.
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Figure 10: DFT of Broadcast SEN+
We use this structure function to verify the probability of failure of the top event:
Theorem 3.1.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2 L3 s.
SEN broad set req p L1 L2 L3 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
(event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(rv to devent p X t)) ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ (L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3) ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p QdSEN+ Broadcast t) =
1 -
(1 -
prob p (DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd t)) *
(Normal
(1 -
(1 -
∏
i∈L1 (real (1 - FXi(t)))) *
(1 -
∏
i∈L2 (real (1 - FXi(t))))) *
Normal (
∏
i∈L3 (real (1 - FXi(t))))))
where SEN broad set req ascertains the conditions required for the sets such as finite-
ness. It also ensures the independence of the events.
Figure 11 shows the evaluation results of the probability of failure of the DFT of
Figure 10 for a 128×128 SEN+. This SEN+ has 63 inputs for each first level OR gate
and the top level OR gate has 66 inputs. As with the terminal SEN+, we assume that
the failure rate of each switching element is 1× 10−5 with a dormancy factor of 0.1.
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Figure 11: Probability of Failure of the Broadcast of a 128× 128 SEN+
3.2 DRBD Analysis of SEN and SEN+
Similar to the DFT SEN broadcast model, we can use the model in Figure 7. However,
as mentioned previously, the number of the blocks is different. Therefore, we can also
use Theorem 2.9 for the broadcast reliability, since this theorem is verified for any
number of system blocks using set s.
Figure 12: Broadcast DRBD model of SEN+
The DRBD of the SEN+ is depicted in Figure 12. The first block (with the spare)
represents the input switch that is connected directly to the source. The failure of
this switch will interrupt the broadcast transmission. Therefore, we add a spare part
to replace it after failure. The series structure on the right side of the figure models
the switches of all destinations, as they are all receiving the transmission. Finally,
the parallel-series structure in the middle, represents the two alternative paths that
are available for each broadcast transmission. For example, for the SEN+ shown in
Figure 3, the number of switches connected to the destinations are four, while each one
of the alternative paths has three switches.
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In order to formally verify the reliability of the broadcast of the SEN+, we first
express it using our operators as:
QSEN+ Broadcast = nR AND (λi. if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) +
(nR AND X L2)
)
else (nR AND X L3)) ({0; 1 2})
(6)
where L1 and L2 are the sets that have the indices of the inner series structures of
the parallel-series structure in the middle. The set {0; 1; 2} indicates that the outer
series structure consists of three main components. The first spare construct has index
0, while the parallel-series structure has index 1. Finally, the series structure on the
left side of Figure 12 has index 2, and L3 has the indices of the blocks in this series
structure. We verify the reliability of this DRBD as:
Theorem 3.2.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2 L3.
SEN broad set req p L1 L2 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(rv to event p X t)) ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QSEN+ Broadcast t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t * Normal (
∏
i∈L3 (real (Rel p (X l) t))) *
(1 - (1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))))
We evaluate the broadcast reliability, in Figure 13, of a 128 × 128 SEN+, where
each inner series structure of Figure 12 has 63 blocks and the series structure on the
right hand side of the figure has 64 blocks. We use the same failure rates of 1 × 10−5
for each switching element with a dormancy factor of 0.1.
4 Network Reliability Analysis of Shuffle-exchange
Networks
According to [18], the network reliability of SENs can be defined as the reliability of
all connections between sources (inputs) and destinations (outputs). In other words,
we are looking at the reliability of the overall network. This is usually modeled using
RBDs. In this section, we use both DFT and DRBD models in different scenarios to
model the reliability of the network.
4.1 DFT Analysis of SEN and SEN+
In the SEN, it is required that all switching elements must work properly in order to
maintain a successful behavior of the network. Thus, the system fails with the failure
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Figure 13: Broadcast Reliability of a 128× 128 SEN+
of any of the switching elements. The behavior can be further enhanced by using
spares. The DFT of the SEN network can be modeled as in Figure 4. However, to
further enhance the system reliability, the reliability engineer may suggest to use more
spares to replace the switching elements. Therefore, we present a generic model, where
the number of switching elements that have spares is generic, as shown in Figure 14.
This model can be also used with both the terminal and broadcast models, when more
spares are required.
Figure 14: DFT of SEN Network with Multiple Spares
The top event of the DFT of Figure 14 can be expressed using the DFT operators
as:
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QdsSEN Network = n OR (MAP (λi. if i ∈ L1 then WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)
else X i) (SET TO LIST (L1 ∪ L2)))
(7)
We verify the probability of failure of the top event in a similar way to Theorem 2.3,
as:
Theorem 4.1.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2.
DISJOINT L1 L2 ∧ FINITE L1 ∧ L1 6= {} ∧
FINITE L2 ∧ L2 6= {} ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L2 ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ∧
indep sets p
(λi.
{rv to devent p
(λi. i ∈ L1 then WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i) else X i)
t i})(L1 ∪ L2) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p QdSEN Network t) =
1-
Normal
(
∏
i∈L1
(real(1- prob p (DFT event p (WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)) t)))) *
Normal (
∏
i∈L2 (real(1-FXi(t)))))
where Y, Ysa and Ysd are groups of indexed random variables that represent the main
and spare switches. Theorem 4.1 provides a generic scenario for the SEN, where L1 and
L2 can be instantiated with any number of distinct indices that represent the system
switches, with and without spares.
The DFT model of the SEN+ network is shown in Figure 15. It consists of a
spare gate for one of the switches in the input stage. The rest of the input switches
(X1,0 - X1,r) are connected directly to the n-OR gate of the top event. Therefore, the
failure of any of these switches leads to the failure of the network. The series of ANDs
and ANDs of ORs are used to model the two available paths. Finally, all destination
switches (X4,0 -X4,k) are required to function and thus they are all connected to the
output OR gate. This DFT is composed of three levels; OR of ANDs of ORs, and thus
we can use the theorems of union of intersections of unions to verify its probability of
failure if the sets of indices are handled properly.
We first express the top event using the DFT operators as:
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Figure 15: DFT of SEN+ Network
QdSEN Network =
n OR
(MAP
(λi. if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))
else if i = 3 then (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L3)))
else if i = 4 then n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L4))
else (X (2 * i)) · (X (2 * i + 1)))
(SET TO LIST ({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)))
(8)
where the spare gate is assigned index 0. The second group of switches has index
1, while the indices of these switches, X1,0 - X1,r, are in set L1. They are repre-
sented as n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1). The output of the AND of ORs is as-
signed index 3 and is modeled as (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2))) · (n OR (MAP
X (SET TO LIST L3))), which is similar to both the terminal and broadcast models.
The group of switches, X4,0 -X4,k, has index 4 and is represented using n OR (MAP X
(SET TO LIST L4)). Thus, we have the indices {0; 1; 3; 4} for the outer groups in the
DFT. However, the last part of the DFT, which is the series of ANDs in the middle of
Figure 15, has a generic number of AND gates and cannot be assigned a specific index.
Therefore, we use set L to get a unique index for the output of each AND gate. We use
this unique number to create the indices of the inputs of each AND gate. For example,
for an index j in set L, we create two indices for the inputs of the AND gate as (2*j)
and (2*j+1). This is modeled as (X (2 * i)) · (X (2 * i + 1))) and set L is used
with the set of indices in the outer level as (SET TO LIST ({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)). It
is important to highlight that the indices of the individual inputs should be unique.
21
We then verify that the DFT event of QdSEN Network is equal to the union of intersection
of union of events as in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.
` ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
FINITE L1 ∧ L1 6= {} ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ L2 6= {} ∧ FINITE L3 ∧
L3 6= {} ∧ FINITE L4 ∧ L4 6= {} ∧ FINITE L ∧
DISJOINT {0; 1; 3; 4} L ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L ⇒ DISJOINT {2 * i; 2 * i + 1} {0; 1; 2; 3; 4}) ∧
disjoint family on
(ind set
[{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4; {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L}])
{0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5} ⇒
(DFT event p (QdSEN Network) t =⋃
{⋂
{⋃ {event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0)]
(rv to devent p X t) i |
i ∈ if a ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {a}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] a} |
a ∈ if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j} |
j ∈ {0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L}
where the conditions are required to ensure that the sets are finite, nonempty and that
at each level of the DFT the indices are unique. It is clear from the theorem how the
hierarchy of the DFT is structured using the sets. For example, “if j ∈ L then {2
* j; 2 * j + 1} else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j” determines the
indices of the second level of the DFT (the ORs) based on the value of j in the outer
level. The first part “if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}” is for the series of ANDs,
while “else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j” is for the rest of the parts
in the second level. Although some of the parts of the DFT have no intermediate OR
gates, like the spare, we implicitly assume that there are OR gates with single inputs
to maintain the consistency. The indices of the second level indicates the indices of the
output of these gates. This can be obvious for the AND of ORs in Figure 15, where the
OR gates have indices 2 and 3. We use an empty set ({}) in the indices of the second
level due to the fact that there is no index 2 in the outer level, and thus we assigned
an empty set in the second level for this index.
We verify the probability of failure of QdSEN Network as:
Theorem 4.3.
` ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
SEN network set req p L1 L2 L3 L4 L
(λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i)
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(λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j)
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)
(event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0)]
(rv to devent p X t)) ∧
(∀ i.
i ∈ L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3 ∪ L4 ∪
{2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} ⇒
rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p
(DFT event p (QdSEN Network) t) =
1 -
(1 - prob p (DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t)) *
Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (1 - FXl(t)))) *
(1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (1 - FXl(t))))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L3 (real (1 - FXl(t)))))) *
Normal (
∏
l∈L4 (real (1 - FXl(t)))) *
Normal (
∏
j∈L (1 - real (FX2*j(t) * FX2*j+1(t)))))
where SEN network set req ensures all the required conditions for the sets to be finite,
nonempty and distinct. It also ensures the independence of the input events. It accepts
all the sets of the indices of the three levels. The second condition (rv gt0 ninfinity
[X i]) ascertains that each element in the group of random variables of X that have
their indices in L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3 ∪ L4 ∪ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L}
are greater than or equal to 0 but not equal +∞. This condition is required to be able
to use the CDF of the random variables.
Figure 16: DFT of SEN+ with Multiple Spares
In a similar manner to the SEN network, we provide a generic model where any
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number of spares can be used for the input switches. The modified DFT is shown in
Figure 16. We express the top event using the DFT operators as:
QdSEN Network2 =
n OR
(MAP
(λi. if i = 0 then WSP (Y 0) (Ysa 0) (Ysd 0)
else if i = 1 then
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1)))
else if i = 3 then (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L3)))
else if i = 4 then n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L4))
else (X (2 * i)) · (X (2 * i + 1)))
(SET TO LIST ({0; 1; 3; 4} UNION L)))
(9)
where Y, Ysa and Ysd are indexed random variables that represent the main and spare
parts for each spare gate. We choose to use the same hierarchy of Figure 15, where
we assign index 0 for the first spare and the rest of the spares have their indices in set
L1. In addition, the model of these additional spares is embedded within X as will be
explained shortly.
We verify the probability of failure of the top event as:
Theorem 4.4.
` ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
SEN network set req p L1 L2 L3 L4 L
(λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i)
(λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j)
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)
(λi.
event set [(DFT event p (WSP (Y 0) (Ysa 0) (Ysd 0)) t,0)]
(rv to devent p X t) i) ∧
(∀ i.
i ∈ L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3 ∪ L4 ∪ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} ⇒
rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L1 ⇒ (X i = WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i))⇒
(prob p
(DFT event p (QdSEN Network2) t) =
1 -
Normal
(
∏
l∈({0}∪L1
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(real (1 - prob p (DFT event p (WSP (Y l) (Ysa l) (Ysd l)) t))) *
(1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (1 - FXl(t))))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L3 (real (1 - FXl(t)))))) *
Normal (
∏
l∈L4 (real (1 - FXl(t)))) *
Normal (
∏
j∈L (1 - real (FX2*j(t) * FX2*j+1(t)))))
where the conditions are similar to Theorem 4.3. However, we add the condition
that (∀ i. i ∈ L1 ⇒ (X i = WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)), which adds the ad-
ditional spare gates. This way, we can use Theorem 4.3 to verify Theorem 4.4. Set {0}
∪ L1 is used to provide the indices of the spares, including the first one with index 0.
We evaluate the probability of failure of the network DFT, shown in Figure 16, for
a 128 × 128 SEN+. The DFT of this SEN has 32 AND gates in the first level. Each
OR gate in the first level has 160 inputs. Furthermore, we assume that all the 64 input
switches have spares. Figure 21 shows the evaluated result of the probability of failure,
where the failure rates of each switching element is 1 × 10−5 with a dormancy factor
of 0.1.
Figure 17: The Probability of Failure of the Network of a 128× 128 SEN+
4.2 DRBD Analysis of SEN and SEN+
Similar to the DFT models, we start first with the network reliability model of the
SEN. Since it is a single path, it can be modeled using the series DRBD of Figure 7.
Thus, we can use Theorem 2.9 to provide a generic expression for its reliability. We
provide a generic model in Figure 18, where additional spares are used. This provides
a general case where we can choose how many switches can be replaced with spares.
We express the structure function of this DRBD using our DRBD operators as:
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Figure 18: DRBD of SEN Network
QsSEN Network = nR AND (λi. if i ∈ L1 then R WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)
else X i) (L1 ∪ L2)
(10)
where L1 and L2 provide the indices of the blocks in the series structure for the spare
constructs and the remaining blocks, respectively.
Similar to the proof steps of Theorem 2.11, we verify the reliability of the SEN
network as:
Theorem 4.5.
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2.
DISJOINT L1 L2 ∧ FINITE L1 ∧ L1 6= {} ∧
FINITE L2 ∧ L2 6= {} ∧
indep sets p
(λi. {if i ∈ L1 then DRBD event p (R WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)) t
else (rv to event p X t) i}) (L1 ∪ L2)⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QSEN Network t) =
Normal
(
∏
i∈L1
(real (Rel p (R WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)) t))) *
Normal (
∏
i∈L2 (real (Rel p (X i) t))))
The DRBD of the SEN+ network is modeled in Figure 19, where only one of the
switches of the input stage can be replaced by a spare. This DRBD is composed of
a series-parallel-series structure. The indices of each level can be treated in a similar
manner to the DFT.
We express the structure function using the operators with the same sets of indices
of the DFT as:
26
Figure 19: DRBD of SEN+ Newtork
QSEN Network = nR AND
(λi.
if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then nR AND X L1
else if i = 3 then (nR AND X L2) + (nR AND X L3)
else if i = 4 then nR AND X L4
else (X (2 * i)) + (X (2 * i + 1)))
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L))
(11)
Then, we verify that the DRBD event of this structure can be expressed as a series-
parallel-series structure as:
Theorem 4.6.
` ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
FINITE L1 ∧ L1 6= {} ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ L2 6= {} ∧ FINITE L3 ∧
L3 6= {} ∧ FINITE L4 ∧ L4 6= {} ∧ FINITE L ∧
DISJOINT {0; 1; 3; 4} L ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L ⇒ DISJOINT {2 * i; 2 * i + 1} {0; 1; 2; 3; 4}) ∧
disjoint family on
(ind set
[{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4;
{2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L}])
{0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5} ⇒
(DRBD event p
(QSEN Network) t =
DRBD series
(λj.
DRBD parallel
(λa.
DRBD series
(λi.
event set
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[(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd t,0)]
(rv to event p X t) i)
((λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i) a))
((λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j) j))
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L))
Finally, we verify the reliability of the DRBD as:
Theorem 4.7.
` ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
SEN network set req p L1 L2 L3 L4 L
(λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i)
(λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j)
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0)]
(rv to event p X t)) ⇒
(prob p
(DRBD event p (QSEN Network) t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t *
Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (Rel p (X l) t))) *
(1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L3 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))) *
Normal (
∏
l∈L4(real (Rel p (X l) t))) *
Normal
(
∏
j∈L
(1 -
real
((1 - Rel p (X (2 * j)) t) *
(1 - Rel p (X (2 * j + 1)) t)))))
It is worth mentioning that the conditions of the sets are similar to Theorem 4.3 of
the DFT.
Finally, we provide a generic model to have any number of spares that can replace
the input switches as shown in Figure 20. We choose to use the same indices of Figure 19
in order to reutilize the verified theorems.
We express the structure of the DRBD of Figure 20 as:
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Figure 20: DRBD of SEN+ Network with Multiple Spares
QSEN Network2 = nR AND
(λi.
if i = 0 then R WSP (Y 0) (Ysa 0) (Ysd 0)
else if i = 1 then nR AND X L1
else if i = 3 then (nR AND X L2) + (nR AND X L3)
else if i = 4 then nR AND X L4
else (X (2 * i)) + (X (2 * i + 1)))
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L))
(12)
where (Y 0), (Ysa 0) and (Ysd 0) are indexed groups of random variables that rep-
resent the main parts and their spares.
Finally, we use Theorem 4.7 to verify the reliability of this DRBD as:
Theorem 4.8.
` ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
SEN network set req p L1 L2 L3 L4 L
(λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i)
(λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j)
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP (Y 0) (Ysa 0) (Ysd 0)) t,0)]
(rv to event p X t)) ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L1 ⇒ (X i = R WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i))) ⇒
(prob p
(DRBD event p (QSEN Network2) t) =
Normal
(
∏
l∈({0}∪L1
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(real (Rel p (R WSP (Y l) (Ysa l) (Ysd l)) t))) * (1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L3 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))) *
Normal (
∏
l∈L4(real (Rel p (X l) t))) *
Normal
(
∏
j∈L
(1 -
real
((1 - Rel p (X (2 * j)) t) *
(1 - Rel p (X (2 * j + 1)) t)))))
We evaluate the network reliability of a 128 × 128 as shown in Figure 20. In
Figure 20, there are 32 parallel structures that are connected in series. The DRBD has
64 spare constructs, while there are 160 blocks in the inner series structures. Finally,
the series structure on the right hand side of Figure 20 has 64 blocks. We assume that
the failure rates of each switching element is 1× 10−5 with a dormancy factor of 0.1.
Figure 21: The Network Reliability of a 128× 128 SEN+
5 Equivalence of SEN DFT and DRBD Models
In [23], we proposed a methodology for where a DFT model can be formally analyzed
using the DRBD algebra and vice versa. To illustrate the utilization of the proposed
methodology, we formally verify the equivalence of the DRBD and the complement of
the DFT events for both terminal and broadcast reliability of SEN and SEN+. The
equivalence of the network models can be conducted in a similar manner. Proving
this equivalence allows verifying the probability of one model and directly use the
equivalence proof to provide the probability of the other model.
We verify the equivalence of the DRBD and DFT models of the terminal reliability
of both SEN and SEN+ as:
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Theorem 5.1. Terminal/Broadcast SEN
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L.
FINITE L ∧ (∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Y s; Ysa s; Ysd s]) ⇒
(DRBD event p
(nR AND
(λi.
if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else X i) {0} ∪ L) t =
p space p DIFF
DFT event p
(n OR
(MAP
(λi.
if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else X i)
(SET TO LIST ({0} ∪ L)))) t)
Theorem 5.2. Terminal SEN+
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2.
FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Y s; Ysa s; Ysd s; Z s; Zsa s; Zsd s]) ⇒
(DRBD event p
(nR AND
(λi.
if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) + (nR AND X L2)
)
else R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) {0; 1; 2}) t =
p space p DIFF
DFT event p
(n OR
(MAP
(λi.
if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then(
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2)))
)
else WSP Z Zsa Zsd) (SET TO LIST {0; 1; 2}))) t)
In a similar manner, we verify the equivalence of the DRBD and DFT models of
the SEN+ broadcast reliability as:
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Theorem 5.3. Broadcast SEN+
` ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2 s.
FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ FINITE L3 ∧
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Y s; Ysa s; Ysd s]) ⇒
(DRBD event p
(nR AND
(λi.
if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) + (nR AND X L2)
)
else (nR AND X L3)) ({0; 1 2}) t =
p space p DIFF
DFT event p
(n OR
(MAP
(λi.
if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then(
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2)))
)
else (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L3))))
({0; 1 2}))) t)
It is worth mentioning that Theorem 5.1 can be used for the equivalence of the
DRBD-DFT models of the SEN in both the terminal and broadcast since they both
share the same structure.
Based on these theorems, we can use one model to verify the probability of the
other model using the probability of the complement.
6 Conclusion
In this report, we presented the formal dynamic dependability analysis of SEN and
SEN+ MINs that form a critical part in the routing process of multiprocessor sys-
tems. We provided generic expressions of reliability and probability of failure that are
independent of the failure distributions. Furthermore, we verified these expressions
for an arbitrary number of system blocks that can be instantiated later to a certain
number without the need to repeat the verification process. For instance, we evaluated
the reliability and probability of failure using MATLAB for a specific number of sys-
tem components based on these generic expressions. It is worth mentioning that such
sound generic results cannot be obtained using simulation or model checking as the
state space should be defined in advance. The proof script of the verification of SEN
and SEN+ is available at [24] and it took around 80 hours to be developed.
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